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Abstract—The severity of amplification attacks has
grown in recent years with recent attacks involving several
hundreds of Gbps attack volume. In this paper, we survey
the threat of amplification attacks and compare a wide
selection of different proposals for preventing, detecting,
and filtering amplification attack traffic. Since source IP
spoofing plays an important part in almost all of the
amplification attacks surveyed, we also survey state-of-
the-art of spoofing defenses as well as approaches to trace
spoofing sources. This work acts as an introduction into
many different types of amplification attacks and source
IP address spoofing. By combining previous works into a
single comprehensive discussion we hope to prevent redun-
dant work and encourage others to find practical solutions
for defending against future amplification attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against networks at-
tempt to make a system or an entire network unavailable
for its intended purpose [1]. In some cases DoS attacks
cause a complete loss of Internet connectivity for the
victim [2]. The motivation for DoS attacks can be finan-
cial [3], [4], political [2], ideological [5], reputation [6],
[7], to test new techniques and prepare for larger attacks,
or purely for disruptive purposes [8].
A general overview of DoS attacks and defense strate-
gies can already be found in the surveys by Mirkovic
and Reiher [9], Douligeris and Mitrokotsa [10], and
more recently Zargar et al. [11]. Instead, this paper
focuses on a particular type of DoS attack called an
amplification attack (also called Distributed Reflective
Denial of Service (DRDoS) attacks [12], [13]) where the
attacker seeks to maximise the volume of attack traffic
sent to the victim whilst minimising the volume of traffic
they send to trigger the attack [14]–[20]. We will not
discuss other low traffic volume and high impact DoS
attacks, e.g., Slowloris [21] or TCP SYN floods [22],
unless their defenses are also applicable to amplification
attacks. Generally, the adversary in amplification attacks
targets vulnerabilities in Internet protocols and services
to amplify the amount of attack traffic. The ease of per-
forming amplification attacks and greater understanding
of their effect has led to an increase of attacks in recent
years. This is supported, e.g., by the OpenDNS Security
Lab that saw over 5,000 different amplification attacks
every hour in 2014 [23], and by Rossow’s survey of
amplification vulnerabilities [13].
The most prominent form of amplification attack seen
in recent years abuses the lack of endpoint verification
in the Internet Protocol (IP) in order to trick third-party
servers into sending large amounts of data to victims.
That is, attackers spoof source IP addresses [24] to hide
their identity and cause third-parties to send data to the
victim as identified by the source address field of the IP
packet. This is also sometimes called reflection because
attackers “reflect” attack traffic off of benign services.
As well as reflection, attackers sometimes strive to
maximize the attack bandwidth sent to the victim by
using amplification. For example, many UDP-based pro-
tocols (such as DNS or NTP) that have a higher response
payload size than the requests can be abused to amplify
the reflected attack traffic. Consider DNS, while DNS
lookup requests are typically rather small, the responses
may be significantly larger, e.g., due to verbose informa-
tion such as DNSSEC records.
By combining reflection and amplification attackers
can generate attack traffic volumes which are signifi-
cantly higher than their uplink bandwidth [2], [4], [8],
[25]. Furthermore, not only single hosts may be affected
by such attacks. Entire networks may struggle to cope
with the extra bandwidth and processing demands [25].
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Fig. 1. Categorisation of the amplification DDoS literature.
Defending against this form of amplification attack
is challenging for network operators. Firstly, the attack
traffic blends in benign communication and may be
hard to distinguish from legitimate traffic. Secondly,
the attack packets received by victims are reflected by
many distributed benign third-parties such as open DNS
resolvers, effectively hiding the attacker’s identity [26].
In this survey paper, we systematically structure ex-
isting research on amplification attacks to assist future
research in this direction. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to categorize an research area that spans
almost 200 publications and has become an important
problem both in academia and practice. To this end, we
first compare various definitions and types of amplifica-
tion attacks. With this foundation, we then systematize
preventive countermeasures, and particularly look at the
problem of (identifying and mitigating) IP spoofing. We
complete our survey with works that proposed reactive
countermeasures to defend against ongoing amplification
attacks. Our main contribution is thus a comprehensive
survey of existing literature that until now was scattered.
The rest of this paper is organised as shown in
Figure 1. In Section II, we present prominent incidents
from the past and discuss amplification attacks in great
detail. We then describe methods to prevent amplification
attacks in Section III. Then special attention is paid to
preventing reflection and IP spoofing in Section IV. We
finish the discussion about the solution space in Sec-
tion V by presenting approaches to detect and filter am-
plification attacks. Finally, we conclude in Section VI.
II. AMPLIFICATION ATTACKS
This section provides a detailed introduction into the
different techniques for amplifying attack traffic. We start
by giving a brief taxonomy and timeline of different
types of amplificaiton attacks, and then we end the
section by describing the techniques used in more detail.
A. Taxonomy and Historical Background
There are many ways of amplifying the volume of
attack traffic in DoS attacks. In this paper we give
special focus to amplification attacks which use UDP
based amplifying protocols and reflection. However, it is
important to be able to distinguist between the different
types of amplificaiton attacks.
1) DNS Servers as Amplifiers: In 1999,
AusCERT [27] warned about amplification attacks
where attackers trick DNS servers into sending large
amounts of data to spoofed IP addresses [24]. In 2000,
the CIAC warned of Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attacks where attackers can send spoofed IP
packets from many different locations [28].
Today, DNS is widely used in amplification attacks
because a 60 byte request from an attacker can easily
generate a 512 byte response [2], [8], [14]. Furthermore,
DNS servers which support Extension mechanisms for
DNS (EDNS) [29] can generate responses which are
nearly 100 times larger than requests [13]. Some at-
tackers even ensure large responses by creating domains
specifically to use in amplification attacks [23].
Any public DNS server which is configured to respond
to requests for hosts outside of their domain can be used
in amplification attacks. DNS servers that are configured
to respond to all such requests are known as open DNS
resolvers. According to the Open DNS Resolver Project
approximately 25 million open DNS resolvers currently
“pose a significant threat” to the Internet [26]. It is also
not difficult to find enough open DNS resolvers to use
in amplification attacks. Rossow showed that it currently
only takes 90 seconds to acquire a list of 100,000 open
DNS resolvers [13].
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Fig. 2. Timeline of amplification attacks and related events.
2) Other UDP Based Services: The DNS based
amplification attacks just described use source IP ad-
dress spoofing to trick third-parties into attacking a
victim [24].
Source IP address spoofing also makes it very difficult
for the victim to track attacker because all attack traffic
they receive will come from third-parties. UDP is also
used by attackers as the transport layer protocol because
it is stateless and has no built in mechanism to verifying
the source IP address of packets.
Recently, another UDP based protocol (SSDP) has
been used with source IP address spoofing in amplifi-
cation attacks. The United States Computer Emergency
Readiness Team (US-CERT) first issued a warning about
SSDP in January 2014 [30], and in October 2014 it was
used to generate 54Gbps of traffic in a single attack [31].
Other well documented DoS attacks that used UDP
and source IP address spoofing are the MIT SNMP
based attack [32], and the CloudFlare attack which
reached a peak of nearly 400Gbps using 4,529 NTP
servers [25]. The huge volume of traffic generated in
the CloudFlare attack was caused by a command in NTP
called “monlist”, which returns a list of the previous 600
IP addresses to access the server. Monlist does not affect
the core functionality of NTP and should be disabled by
upgrading to version 4.2.7 and above [33].
3) Smurf and Fraggle Attacks: As well as misusing
UDP based services, there are many other ways of
amplifying attack traffic volume. For example, prior
to 1998 attackers were sending ICMP requests to the
broadcast address of networks whilst spoofing the source
IP address of victims. The routers receiving the ICMP
requests broadcast the requests to all of the hosts on their
network. These attacks are known as Smurf attacks [35],
[36], and in Smurf attacks the routers which broadcast
the requests act as amplifiers because they increase the
volume of attack traffic.
End hosts which respond to requests after they are
broadcast may be amplifiers as well. For example, in
Fraggle attacks an attacker may send CharGen requests
to the broadcast address of many networks at the same
time [37]. End hosts which receive CharGen requests
may respond with much more data than they receive,
thus the end hosts in Fraggle attacks are amplifiers as
well as the routers which broadcast the request.
4) Fork Loops: There is also another category of
amplification attacks which we have not yet covered.
In 2009 Shankesi et al. [38] described an amplification
attack as being where ”the number of messages on the
network can amplify to essentially an arbitrary large
number” [16]. It is important to note however that this
definition doesn’t take into account the size difference
between request and response packets, which is an
important factor in the UDP based amplification attacks
we have already mentioned.
The amplification attacks described by Shankesi et
al. are caused by “fork loops” which are used to at-
tack VoIP networks running SIP [38]. Fork loops are
situations where requests are sent between SIP proxies
indefinitely and at least one extra request is generated
every iteration [16]. Using this type of amplification
attack it is possible to cause 2 SIP proxies to exchange
up to 270 duplicate requests consuming their resources
and preventing them from responding to legitimate re-
quests [38].
B. Responding to a Growing Threat
Today, Smurf, Fraggle, and Fork Loop attacks have
largely been countered by better network configuration
and patches to SIP respectively. However, attacks involv-
ing reflection and UDP based amplification are growing
in number.
Akamai detected 9 DoS attacks involving NTP, Char-
Gen, and SSDP which peaked over 100 Gbps in the last
3 months of 2014. This is three times more than in the
same period in 2013 [34].
3
TABLE I
RECENT LARGE SCALE AMPLIFICATION ATTACKS AND THEIR PROPERTIES
Reference Year Amplification Protocol Peak Traffic Attacker Description
MIT [32] 2013 SNMP Unknown Unknown
Spoofed requests were directed to
SNMP enabled devices on the MIT net-
work which attacked devices outside
the network.
GreenNet [2] 2013 DNS 100 Gbps Unknown
Attackers brought down GreenNet, a
hosting company who’s customers in-
cluding Privacy International and Zim-
babwe Human Rights Forum.
Prolexic [4] 2013 DNS 167Gbps Unknown The attack targeted a real-time financialexchange platform.
Spamhaus [8] 2013 DNS 300Gbps Cyberbunk
Over 30,000 DNS servers were in-
volved in the amplification attack. At-
tackers also used SYN floods and pre-
fix hijacking to disrupt the Internet
connectivity of Spamhaus and Project
Honeypot.
PhantomL0rd [7] 2013 NTP 100Gbps
A hacker group named
DERP claimed respon-
sibility on Twitter.
Attackers targeted game servers and
streaming sites. Attacks against the
games industry are becoming increas-
ingly popular [34].
CloudFlare [25] 2014 NTP 400Gbps Unknown
Latency increased all over Europe fol-
lowing attack using 4,529 NTP servers.
French hosting firm OVH also claimed
to have seen an attack over 350Gbps at
the same time.
Akamai [31] 2014 SSDP 54Gbps Unknown Many of the devices used in this attackwere home-based UPnP devices.
Figure 2 and Table I illustrate that the bandwidth used
in amplification attacks is also growing. In March 2013
an amplification attack was launched against Spamhaus
[8]. The DNS based attack reached an estimated peak
of about 300Gbps and was the biggest DoS attack ever
recorded [39]. Nearly a year later and an even bigger
attack reportedly reached a peak of 400Gbps by using
NTP [25].
The attack traffic generated during the Spamhaus
attack came from over 30,000 different DNS servers.
In order to guard against this and future attacks, they
deployed anycast routing and a distributed Content
Delivery Network (CDN) [8]. Anycast involves BGP
routers simultaneously advertising the same destination
IP address so that attack traffic can be absorbed by
many different data centers. However, relying on anycast
and CDNs may be a short term solution, and it can
only prevent amplification attacks when amplifiers and
anycast routes are evenly distributed around the Internet.
The CloudFlare attack came 1 month after a “monlist”
warning issued by US-CERT [33], and during a 13-
week period in which Ku¨hrer et al. reported a 92% drop
in the number of vulnerable NTP servers [19]. As a
consequence we may need to reevaluate how we respond
to threats as they are discovered. For example, alerting
system administrators about protocol vulnerabilities may
prompt attackers to abuse the identified amplification
vectors.
C. Problem Description
In this section we will provide high level descriptions
of the attacks and concepts seen so far. We will start by
discussing the amplification factor of different attacks
and go on to describe the building blocks of the most
common amplification attacks.
1) Amplification Factor: The amplification factor of
an attack (X(P )) for a protocol (P ) is the ratio of the
total number of bytes in the amplified traffic (explicitly
including headers, padding and payloads of all protocols
involved, such as Ethernet, IP, UDP or the application-
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level protocol) and the number of bytes sent by the
attacker (same calculation), as shown in Equation 1.
X(P ) =
number of response bytes(P )
number of request bytes(P )
(1)
Our definition is slightly different from the one used
in [13], as we explicitly include all lower-level proto-
cols, whereas Rossow focused on the number of UDP
payload bytes. Still, the amplification factors provided
by Rossow [13] offer a convenient way of comparing
protocols and can help with prioritization. For example,
Rossow found that NTP had the highest amplification
factor all of the protocols he tested. He found that if
attacks carefully select the NTP servers to maximize
their attack they can achieve an amplification factor
of 4670, which when compared to 64 for open DNS
resolvers shows us how urgent it is to update existing
NTP infrastructure.
2) Reflection: Many of the amplification attacks in
the past were possible because the attacker can spoof
the address of the victim causing traffic to be “reflected”
by third-party servers, e.g., by open DNS resolvers [40]
(see Section II-A). Figure 3 shows a reflection attack
where an attacker (M ) changes the source address in
the request it sends to the reflector (R). Not knowing
that the source address was spoofed, the reflector sends
its response to the final destination (D, i.e., the victim).
The key advantages of reflection attacks for the at-
tacker are: (a) attackers hide their identity from D be-
cause all traffic received by D comes from third-parties;
(b) attackers can trigger attacks coming from different
geographic or topological regions of the Internet; and
(c) attackers do not receive responses and therefore do
not risk using up their available download bandwidth.
R
M D
Request Response
Fig. 3. Reflection attack. An attacker (M ) sends a spoofed request
to a reflector (R) which responds to the final destination (D).
One example of a DoS attack which uses reflection is a
TCP SYN/ACK attack, where an attacker sends spoofed
SYN requests to a reflector so that the reflector sends
SYN/ACK packets to the victim [41].
As well as the final destination as indicated by the
spoofed source IP address, it is also possible for reflec-
tors and those that use them legitimately to be victims
of reflection attacks. For example, in SYN flooding
attacks [42]–[47], the attacker floods a reflector with
spoofed SYN requests and changes the source IP address
of packets so they do not receive replies. The aim of
SYN flooding attacks is not to attack the final destination
indicated by the spoofed IP address, but to consume
enough resources at the reflector to make it unresponsive
to legitimate traffic. The adversary can also attack multi-
homed networks using reflectors. For example, if the
reflector is connected to the Internet by at least two
uplinks, and the link between the reflector and the
final destination offers significantly lower bandwidth
compared to the link between the attacker and reflector.
Then by carefully selecting a spoofed source address
which is reachable via the low bandwidth connection,
the attacker can implement a DoS attack on this link.
It is worth mentioning again, however, that not all
of the amplification attacks described in this paper use
reflection, e.g., fork loop based attacks do not [16].
3) Amplification: A key factor in amplification at-
tacks is the ability of attackers to trigger responses which
are significantly larger than the requests, either in terms
of bytes or number of packets. Figure 4 describes the
basic scenario without reflection where an attacker sends
a request to an amplifier (A) which responds with a
higher volume of data than it receives. In this scenario
the amplifier, or the network between the attacker and
the amplifier, are the victim because they cannot cope
with the amplified traffic. The main advantage of such
an attack is twofold. First, the adversary saves resources
with respect to its network uplink. This is important in
case of mobile scenarios. Second, discovering the trigger
of the attack is more challenging. In contrast to high
volume flooding attacks, amplification triggers are hardly
visible on frequently used uplinks, which complicates
early detection.
It is worth noting that the attacker model implies that
the attacker is either capable to handle potential response
traffic or that the attacker will not receive the response
data. The latter follows directly in case of a successful
attack but can also be achieved by address renewals at
the attacker side.
Pure amplification attacks will be of increased impor-
tance with the upcoming deployment of the Internet of
Things (IoT). IoT networks are characterized by con-
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strained devices with limited network capacity, typically
connected via border routers to the Internet. Congesting
the path from some of the IoT devices to the gateway
may lead to disconnecting the complete IoT domain.
M A
Request
Response
Fig. 4. Simple amplification attack. An attacker (M ) sends a request
to an amplifier (A) which responds with more data than it received.
The response line is dashed in this instance to indicate that the
attacker may not receive the response.
4) Reflection and Amplification Together: All of the
amplification attacks seen in Table I combine reflection
and amplification, a high level overview of these attacks
is given in Figure 5. In this model an attacker (M )
sends requests using the amplification protocol (P ) to
the amplifiers (A) but also uses reflection so that the
amplifiers respond to the victim (V ).
A1M
A2
A3
V
Request
Request
Request
Response
Response
Response
1) Attacker sends
small requests to
amplifiers using
the source IP
address of V.
2) Amplifiers send
large and/or many
responses to V
saturating its
bandwidth.
Fig. 5. An attacker (M ) sends spoofed requests to many amplifiers
(A) causing amplified responses to be sent to the victim (V ).
The volume of attack traffic which can be sent to V de-
pends on the accumulated available bandwidth between
M and A1...An, the accumulated available bandwidth
between A1...An and V , and the amplification factor of
P . Depending on the success of the attack, the volume
of traffic sent to the victim can result in a complete loss
of connectivity for the victim and their network.
5) Amplification Attacks Using a Botnet: Most am-
plification attacks are launched from single origins [48]
and just appear to be distributed due to the large set
of amplifiers. However, a single attacker may not have
sufficient uplink bandwidth to send requests to many
amplifiers at the same time. Attackers can target more
amplifiers, and further obscure the origin of attacks, by
means of a botnet [17], [49].
The owners of bot-infected systems are unaware that
their machines are being used in DDoS attacks. Alter-
natively, in crowd-sourced DDoS botnets, participants
willingly install attacking software on their machines,
e.g., the Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) software [50].
Such volunteer botnets were used in Operation Payback
to attack global companies, such as MasterCard, Visa,
and PayPal [5].
Figure 6 shows one model of an amplification attack
using a botnet. In this example the attacker uses a
controller (C) to send instructions to the botnet (B). The
bots then send spoofed requests to amplifiers at similar
times, such that the bandwidth of B1...Bn accumulates.
Botnet B
Requests Responses
Command
A1
A2
A3
B2
B1
B3
C V
Fig. 6. An attacker uses a controller (C) to instruct a botnet (B) to
simultaneously send spoofed requests to many amplifiers (A), causing
amplified responses to be sent to the victim (V ).
6) Fraggle and Smurf Attacks: Fraggle and Smurf
also use reflection and amplification, but their attacks
look slightly different from the model in Figures 5 and 6.
Figure 7 shows a Smurf attack where M sends a request
to the broadcast address of network (N ), A acts as the
amplifier by duplicating the request, and the reflectors
(R) send responses to the victim V . Fraggle attacks are
similar to Smurf attacks but the requests are amplified
even further by the end hosts that receive them.
7) Fork Loops: Fork loops are different to the reflec-
tion and amplification attacks because they rely on mes-
sages recursively being sent between SIP proxies [16].
Yet fork loops have also been referred to as amplification
attacks because they provide a way for an attacker to
amplify the number of requests they send to SIP proxies.
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Network N
M A R2
R1
R3
V
Request Request
Request
Request
Response
Response
Response
1) M sends a single
request to the broadcast
address of network N.
2) A acts an emplifier
by broadcasting the
request to R1, R2, and R3.
3) The reflectors
send responses to
the victim.
Fig. 7. Smurf attack. An attacker (M ) sends a spoofed request to
the broadcast address of network (N ). The amplifier (A) broadcasts
the request to many reflectors (R) which respond to the victim (V ).
Figure 8 shows one example of what can happen when
two SIP proxies (L1 and L2) are not configured correctly
and do not detect loops. It depicts the scenario described
in [38] where a request for the user a@L1 is sent to
the proxy L1. In this example, L1 has two options for
reaching a@L1 which are both located at L2. This causes
L1 to fork the request and send two copies to a@L2 and
b@L2 which also both fork the request to a@L1 and
b@L1. The scenario is caused by misconfiguration and
can potentially result in 2n duplicate requests created
where n is the number of iterations.
a@L1
a@L2
a@L1
a@L2
...
...
b@L2
...
...
b@L1
a@L2
...
...
b@L2
...
...
b@L2
a@L1
a@L2
...
...
b@L2
...
...
b@L1
a@L2
...
...
b@L2
...
...
Fig. 8. Fork Loops. In this example taken from [38] a single request
spawns 2n duplicates where n is the number of iterations.
D. Discussion
In this section we have described many different types
of amplification attacks. It is clear from our descriptions
that the attacks seen in Table I are very different from
Fraggle and Fork Loop attacks.
Therefore, this survey will focus on the types of
amplification attacks seen in Table I and as described in
Figures 5 and 6. The major advantages of amplification
attacks from an adversarial point of view are:
• Attack traffic can be amplified beyond the attacker’s
upload bandwidth.
• The attacker remains anonymous by using reflection
(IP address spoofing).
• The attack traffic at reflectors and amplifiers can be
very difficult to distinguish from legitimate traffic.
• The attack complexity is rather low and it is thus
relatively straightforward to get started with ampli-
fication attacks even for the wide audience.
III. PREVENTING AMPLIFICATION ATTACK
In this section, we will describe preventative measures
for the amplification attacks. For example, we discuss
preventative measures which amplifiers can use before
responding to requests (e.g. response rate limiting), and
more radical approaches such as alternative content
delivery systems [51]. We will discuss non-preventive
(i.e., reactive) countermeasures, such as detection and
filtering, in Section V.
A. Alternative Internet Architectures
Alternative Internet architectures such as Capability
Based Architectures (CBA) [52], [53] or Content-Centric
Networking (CCN) [51] may remove existing DoS vec-
tors. For example, in CBA, senders must first obtain
“permission to send” from the destination before sending
packets. Anderson et al. [52] proposed that verification
points around the network ensure that the source has
permission to send data to the destination. To obtain
permission, Anderson et al. suggested that the source
uses Request-To-Send (RTS) packets, which are routed
between RTS servers to ensure the victim is not flooded.
However, the problem with the CBA system from
Anderson et al. [52], and the more recent TVA [53],
is that every packet must include some kind of extra
“capability” information. Maintaining, exchanging, and
checking capabilities creates a lot of extra overhead
for networks, and the increased packet size may also
increase fragmentation.
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CCN will remove the possibility of DNS based am-
plification attacks simply because DNS is no longer re-
quired. In CCN, ISPs can deploy content routers to cache
data which many users request. However, CCN uses the
request/response paradigm in the form of “Interest” and
“Data” packets, and it is currently unknown how resilient
CCN would be to amplification attacks or new forms of
DoS attacks.
B. Lowering Amplification Factors
Alternative, to remain compatible with the current
Internet design, is fixing the protocols that are vulnerable
to amplification. One such approach is to lower the
amplification factors, e.g., by increasing the size of the
requests in vulnerable protocols. This would reduce the
amplification factor, but also increase the traffic across
the Internet, which is not desirable. Moreover, it is
not reasonable to suggest that all protocols should be
amplification free. For example, it is quite reasonable to
expect that request packets for large files are smaller or
fewer than the response.
A more practical approach for lowering the amplifica-
tion factors may be to disable the redundant services that
amplifiers offer. For example, Rossow showed that the
Network Time Protocol (NTP) has the highest amplifi-
cation factor out of the 14 UDP protocols he tested [13].
Ku¨hrer et al. achieved a reduction of the amplification
factor of NTP by disabling the NTP services with the
highest request/response factors [19]. Since the services
with the highest request/response factors do not affect
the core capabilities of NTP, these extra services can be
disabled while still enabling time synchronization.
Next to NTP, many other protocols (e.g. DNS, Char-
Gen, SNMP) can be used for amplification attacks.
Some DNS providers have recently started deprecating
the DNS ANY request in response to the growing
threat of amplification attacks. One provider, CloudFlare,
now responds with the RCODE 4 “Not Implemented”1.
However, identifying and disabling services with high
request/response factors takes time, and may result in
the loss of functionality for benign applications.
One technique to reveal protocols which suffer from
amplification attacks due to misconfiguration or bad
design can be model checking [16]. By modeling the
protocol using rewriting logic [54], a set of system
states can be generated and checked for amplification
by comparing the cost of servicing requests against a
1https://blog.cloudflare.com/deprecating-dns-any-meta-query-type/
predefined threshold2. This approach can be used to
detect flaws in protocols where the amplification factor
at a single point might not seem significantly high, and
it has been used to describe forking loops in SIP [16].
C. Reducing the Number of Amplifiers
Many amplifiers were used in the larger amplification
attacks. For example, over 30,000 separate open DNS
resolvers were used in the Spamhaus attack (See Table I).
A number of projects listed in Section VI are attempting
to bring misconfigured amplifiers to the attention of
system administrators so that they can be patched or
configured correctly. However, this relies on widespread
cooperation between administrators who may not have
the knowledge or the resources to update their servers.
Another interesting point to make here is does the
Internet need so many public services such as DNS
servers? Perhaps more cooperation between network
providers can lower the impact of amplification attacks
by lowering the number of amplifiers required to operate
the Internet.
D. Response Rate Limiting
Moreover, amplifiers could also be configured to re-
spond to a limited number of request from each IP or
network address within a given time frame. For example,
support for response rate limiting is easily applied to
DNS when using newer versions of BIND. However,
rate response rate limiting protects against abuse of a
single amplifier and an attacker may simply choose to
use multiple amplifiers at a low request rate. It only
takes an attacker a short amount of time to look for
a sufficient number of different amplifiers (less than a
minute in some case [13]).
E. Sessions for UDP
Many amplification attacks rely on stateless commu-
nication via the UDP protocol in order to send large
amounts of data to spoofed IP addresses. Those amplifi-
cation attacks are made more difficult if UDP-based pro-
tocols required sessions to be opened (similar to the TCP
three-way handshake) before large amounts of response
data can be transmitted. To counter this, one can include
session information in UDP packets. For example, clients
using the Steam query protocol have to request a 4-
byte challenge before they can request large amounts
of information about a game server [55]. The client
has to append the challenge response to future requests.
2The cost in [16] is the number of duplicate packets generated by
SIP proxies
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However, attackers may be able to use responses from
session initialisation exchanges for amplification attacks
so long as they can open new sessions for the same
victim with many amplifiers, and can also eavesdrop on
the victims Internet traffic to see responses.
A downside to session hardening UDP protocols is
that it increases the packet sizes (and, depending on
the implementation, requires additional packets for a
handshake), which conflicts in particular in resource-
constraint and real-time contexts. It may also add latency
to the initial request to open a sessions. The most
challenging aspect of session hardening existing UDP-
based services is compatibility with existing clients. In
order to prevent amplification attacks session support
would have to be universal, and upgrading may cause
problems with legacy systems.
F. Differentiating Bots From Humans
Also Completely Automated Public Turing tests to tell
Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHAs) [56] would
prevent attackers from using certain services in DoS
attacks. While successful to defend against application-
level DoS attacks, CAPTCHAs are not successfully
used in practice against amplification attacks, and we
name them for completeness only. Consider, for example,
DNS, where lookups are often caused by a user visiting a
website. If such DNS requests required that a user com-
pletes a CAPTCHA, then it would be harder for attackers
to use open DNS resolvers for attacks. However, this
may delay a users access to information and complicate
legitimate automated services which use DNS. With this
in mind, Oikonomou [57] attempted to model human
behavior so that servers can automatically distinguish
between requests from bots and requests from humans.
There is another problem with only replying to re-
quests from humans, and that is that many legitimate
automated processes need to make requests for infor-
mation over the Internet. These processes are prevented
from accessing services secured by a CAPTCHA or other
bot detection mechanisms.
G. Filtering Spoofed Packets
In most amplification attacks the attacker sends re-
quests with the spoofed IP address of the victim. Fil-
tering spoofed packets is considered one of the most
effective countermeasures against amplification and other
DoS attacks [19], [58]–[60]. However, in 2005 the MIT
ANA Spoofer Project showed that around 25% of ASes
allowed spoofed IP packets to be sent out of their net-
work, and the ability of attackers to launch amplification
attacks shows that it is still a problem today. Recent
estimates state that it is still possible to send spoofed IP
packets from about 20% of the Internet [58]. The next
section will discuss spoofing in more detail and discuss
some of the methods proposed to defend against it.
IV. SOURCE IP ADDRESS SPOOFING
An inherent requirement for amplification attacks in
practice is IP address spoofing. UDP and IP have no
built-in mechanism to determine if the source address is
spoofed, so amplifiers reply to the spoofed address in-
stead of the original sender. Using spoofing for malicious
purposes was first discussed in 1989 [24], and a detailed
analyses of the problem was carried out by Heberlein and
Bishop in 1996 [61], and again by Dunigan in 2001 [62].
Since then there have been many other surveys related to
spoofing which we have summarized in Table II. These
surveys can be broadly categorized as either focusing on
spoofed packet detection/filtering [63], [64], or tracing
the attacker [65]–[68].
Chen and Yeung [43] also define three common IP
spoofing techniques which all have different purposes,
random spoofing, subnet spoofing, and fixed spoofing. In
random spoofing, the attacker randomly generates source
addresses for the attacking packets. This technique is
often used in TCP SYN flood attacks [22] where the
destination of replies are not relevant to the success of
the attack but the attacker still wants to obscure their
identity. In subnet spoofing the attacker will choose a
source address in its own subnet, which can help to
avoid some countermeasures such as ingress filtering, but
limits the number of possible victims. Fixed spoofing is
the form of spoofing which is most commonly used in
amplification attacks. This is where the attacker chooses
the IP address of a single victim to be the source address
on the spoofed packets, meaning that replies will be sent
to the victim and not the attacker(s).
We will start this section by discussing the techniques
used to monitor spoofing and to map networks which do
not guard against it. Later we will (a) survey the contri-
butions listed in Table II in a single concise discussion,
and (b) significantly extending the discussion to include
new approaches. This will involve categorizing spoofing
defenses as being for either packet filtering or traceback,
as shown in Figure 9.
A. Monitoring Spoofing In The Wild
There are two techniques which are being used to look
at spoofing on the Internet. Active monitoring attempts
to send spoofed packets and monitor the replies, while
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TABLE II
SURVEY PAPERS FOR FILTERING SPOOFED IP PACKETS AND
DETECTING ATTACKERS.
Survey Name Papers Covered
Detecting Spoofed Packets [69] [70]–[72]
IP Spoofing Defense: An Intro-
duction [63]
[73]–[88]
On the State of IP Spoofing De-
fense [64]
[69], [73], [75], [76], [81],
[82], [85], [86], [89]–[106]
DDoS: Survey of Traceback
Methods [66]
[71], [76], [90], [107]–[117]
A Survey of IP Traceback
Mechanisms to Overcome
Denial-of-service Attacks [67]
[110], [113], [118]–[121]
A Survey on Packet Marking
and Logging [68]
[90], [110], [111], [113],
[115], [118], [120]–[128]
On IP Traceback [65] [42], [70], [104], [107]–
[111], [113], [129], [130]
Spoofing
Defenses
Traceback
Link Testing
Tunneling
using IPSec
Controlled
Flooding
Input
Debugging
ICMP
Traceback
Packet Marking
Using
Traffic Logs
Detecting
and Filtering
Spoofed Packets
Using Network
Topology
Learning
Directions
Ingress Filtering
and RPF
IP Headers
Routing Tables
Flow
Correlation
Validating
Source
Addresses
Third-Parties
Encrypting
IP Packets
Peer-to-Peer
Fig. 9. A categorization of source IP address spoofing defenses.
passive monitoring requires analyses of Internet traffic,
e.g, NetFlow data. In the following two subsections we
examples of both approaches.
1) Active Monitoring: The MIT Spoofer Project [58]
measures how susceptible the Internet is to IP spoof-
ing. To achieve a high coverage they have created and
distributed an application which volunteers can install.
The application sends several spoofed UDP packets to
a server controlled by the project. The application then
connects to the server using legitimate means to deter-
mine which packets were received or lost. The results
of the MIT Spoofer Project have shown that about 25%
of ASs are currently vulnerable to IP spoofing. Daily
statistics are also available on their website [131].
Ku¨hrer et al. [19] leverage the fact that some DNS
proxies do not correctly change the IP addresses when
forwarding DNS packets to test if their AS allows IP
spoofing. They found 2,063 ASes that allow spoofed
traffic by detecting if DNS replies have a different source
IP addresses than the destination of the initial request.
The disadvantage of their approach is that it relies on
networks which have open DNS resolvers that do not
change the source IP address on responses. However,
their approach does not depend on the distribution of
volunteers like the Spoofer Project, and the researchers
were largely free to choose which networks to investigate
due to the many available open DNS resolvers.
2) Passive Monitoring: An orthogonal question to
see who is spoofing, is to measure how much Internet
traffic is actually being spoofed. The UCSD Network
Telescope from CAIDA [59] is attempting to answer
this question by monitoring traffic which is sent to
darknets. A darknet is an address-space which is routable
but where no traffic is expected to be sent, i.e., the
addresses are not allocated. Monitoring traffic to darknets
can be used to spot attacks, scans of the Internet, and
misconfiguration of machines.
To explain how a darknet can be used to detect spoofed
packets we will briefly describe the steps of a TCP-
SYN flooding attack [22]. When an attacker is using
spoofing for a TCP-SYN flooding attack and randomly
chooses a source address for the spoofed packets, there
is a chance that the address is in the address space
of the darknet. As a consequence, the victim of the
attack will response to the spoofed addresses, and the
SYN/ACK packets from the victim will appear as traffic
to the darknet. These SYN/ACK packets are known as
backscatter, and since the darknets are supposed to cause
no traffic, backscatter is assumed to be the result of
spoofing once misconfiguration has been ruled out.
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B. Validating the Source IP Address
There is no built in mechanism in the Internet Protocol
which can prevent spoofing. Its function is simply to
provide best effort delivery of datagrams [132]. Never-
theless, over the next two subsections we will discuss
various techniques which can be used to filter spoofed
packets. In this section we will concentrate on methods
which use some form of authentication to validate pack-
ets as they arrive and filter those which are not validated.
In the next section we will look at more probabilistic
methods.
1) End-to-End Address Verification: There are many
end-to-end methods with which peers can attempt to
validate the source IP address of packets. For example,
probes can be used to provoke responses from the source
address to see if it sent the packet [46]. However,
packet loss means that some probes may be lost, and
other unpredictable behaviour in the Internet means that
probing cannot guarantee that the packet was spoofed.
Additional information embedded in packets and
which can be validated using a peer-to-peer network has
been used to authenticate the source IP address [75],
[84], [97], [103], [133], [134]. This information can be
unique between two peers, and may also have a time
limit associated with it. The literature also uses different
terminology to refer this data. Common notations are
“cookie” [97], [98], [135] or “key” if the data is used in
cryptographic functions [75], [103], [136].
Whilst the basic principle of using end-to-end methods
to validate the source IP address is the same, all of the
proposals have their own strengths and weaknesses. For
example, large “puzzles” sent by servers may themselves
be used in amplification attacks [98], and there are ad-
ditional processing and space overheads associated with
generating and stamping “passports” that are appended to
packets [103]. Some of these overheads can be lowered,
for example, if only routers at the edge of networks
add data to, and validate, packets. However, this implies
cooperation between network operators to install new
functionality at the edges of their networks when the
benefits to them may not outweigh the extra costs.
Lu et al. [133] proposed Multi-purpose Anti-Spoofing
Key (MASK) where packets are tagged with MASK la-
bels which are unique between the source and destination
routers. At first, MASK labels are exchanged using a
TCP connection. Then, MASK labels can be included
in subsequent packets by overwriting the ID field in the
IP header. However, MASK needs to be evaluated in
more realistic scenarios. Overwriting the ID field means
that datagrams can not be fragmented. It is also not
clear how big MASK labels are, and if they will fit in
the 16-bit ID field. Furthermore, MASK appears to be
susceptible to eavesdropping attacks as MASK labels are
not exchanged securely and are also sent in plain text in
subsequent packets.
Another example is the Source Address Validation
Architecture with Host Identity Protocol (SAVAH) [136],
which can filter spoofed packets at the edge of local net-
works. It requires that all end-hosts and gateway routers
support the Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [137], [138].
SAVAH filters spoofed packets by requiring senders
replace the source IP address of packets with a hash.
The hash is created using the contents of each packet
and a key agreed previously when the sender joined the
network. This is cryptographically stronger than [133]
so long as the key was exchange securely. However, this
approach degrades performance of the network rapidly
due to the processing overheads of hashing every packet.
2) Encryption: An overall more secure approach than
appending validation data to packets is to encrypt all IP
packets. Using encryption between peers would not only
prevent most spoofing attacks, but it also has the added
benefit of all Internet traffic being secure by default [94].
One suitable mechanism by Gilad and Herzberg provides
relatively lightweight encrypted communication [47].
However, the computational overheads and extra traf-
fic caused by encrypting all IP traffic is currently im-
practical, and would also conflict with IoT scenarios
using constrained devices. Nevertheless, encryption can
be used in select cases such as communication with
amplifiers.
3) Third-party Authentication: Sometimes it is not
desirable for routers and end-points to use end-to-end
address verification, or negotiate keys and encrypt pack-
ets because of the additional processing and latency
overheads. Using extra third-parties which are usually
not involved in packet forwarding offers a way of
authenticating packets which can potentially lower the
extra processing demands placed on routers and end-
points [45], [139]–[141].
For example, Gonzalez et al. [140] proposed that
routers should send copies of packets to a “judge”
(the trusted third-party). The judge should know the IP
addresses serviced by the routers in order to make a
decision whether or not the packet is spoofed, and the
judge can also query routers in the absence of data.
Noureldien et al. [45], [141] suggested that authenti-
cation servers in local networks can be used to determine
if TCP-SYN packets are spoofed. They propose that
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all packets that exit a network are inspected by an
authentication server. An authentication server can also
check incoming packets with the authentication server at
the source network. This approach can lower processing
overheads for some hosts in the network but it does
not address concerns about additional latency and traffic
volume.
C. Flow Correlation
Flow telemetry can help to identify anomalies in
network traffic by inspecting statistical information of
traffic that is aggregated by source and destination ad-
dresses/ports. Kreibich et al. proposed to inspect asym-
metries in packet counts per flow direction to find reflec-
tion attacks from the victim’s perspective [142]. Rossow
proposed to leverage volume asymmetries to identify
amplification attacks, both from the amplifier’s and vic-
tim’s perspective [13]. Related methods that target non-
amplification attacks aim to detect TCP-SYN flooding
attacks by observing unbalanced SYN and SYN-ACK
packet flows [43], [44], [113], [121], [143], [144].
D. Filtering Spoofed Packets Using Network Topology
Almost all of the filtering methods seen so far come
with a high cost in terms of additional latency, traffic
volume, and/or processing at routers. In this section we
will discuss methods which can lower the overheads
by using what information is already known about the
structure of the Internet. For example, some IP addresses
are not meant to be used outside of local networks.
Packets with private IP addresses (e.g., 192.168.1.1)
should not be routed, as Network Address Translation
(NAT) [145] at the source network should have changed
the source address of the packet.
More generic methods of detecting spoofed packets,
as discussed next, are probabilistic because the Internet
is both dynamic and complex. However, some of these
approaches also include a mechanism to determine if a
packet was actually spoofed following detection.
1) Using IP Headers: One way with which spoofed
packets can be filtered without using additional band-
width is to analyze information present in the IP headers.
If the legitimate values for a source IP address is known,
then spoofed packets which do not have the correct
information can be identified and filtered.
For example, spoofed packets can be filtered if their
hop count does not match what is known about the
topology of upstream routers. This information can be
estimated using the Time To Live (TTL) field in the IP
header [85], [99], [146]. However, there may be many
paths between the source and destination of spoofed
packets. One interesting idea is to use Ant Colony
Optimisation (ACO) algorithms to find these paths [147],
and to collect TTL values which can be used to filter
spoofed packets.
It is even possible to filter spoofed packets by de-
tecting what operating system a remote host is using,
i.e., by estimating the initial TTL of packets [91], [93].
However, filtering spoofed packets based on the TTL
and other fields does not guard against spoofing attacks
where the attacker can manipulate the values in the IP
header.
2) Ingress Filtering and RPF: Filtering IP packets
with spoofed addresses can be achieved using knowl-
edge of the IP addresses allocated by the upstream or
downstream networks [73], [100], [148]. Ingress filtering
filters incoming packets. In contrast, egress filtering
filters packets which are exiting the network.
Ingress filtering (BCP 38) is sometimes implemented
at the periphery of the Internet to stop packets with
spoofed addresses being routed by edge routers [73].
However, not all network operators implement BCP
38. Ingress Access Lists are also typically maintained
manually, and having outdated or misconfigured lists can
prevent legitimate or allow spoofed traffic [102].
Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF) is an imple-
mentation of BCP 38 and uses forward routing informa-
tion to filter spoofed packets [83]. Incoming packets are
checked against a routers Forwarding Information Base
(FIB) to ensure that packets are only forwarded if they
come from the interface which is on the router’s best
path to the source address. uRPF also has a “loose mode”
where it can check the source addresses packets without
taking the interface into account. This allowed uRPF
to be used on routers with multiple links to multiple
ISPs [83].
3) Learning Directions: Routers can record informa-
tion from incoming packets in order to filter traffic which
comes from unexpected directions [74], [78]–[80], [89],
[106]. The Source Address Validity Enforcement (SAVE)
protocol [104] is one example where routers can learn
the expected incoming interface for a source address in
order to authenticate subsequent packets.
The approach proposed by Wu et al. [89] is called
Source Address Validation Architecture (SAVA). To pre-
vent IP spoofing in a local network, SAVA routers bind
the source IP address and MAC address to a specific
switch port. The next step is to filter packets at the Intra-
AS level. This is done by associating source addresses
with the incoming interface. The last step, filtering
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spoofed packets at inter-AS level, involves adjacent ASes
exchanging address blocks so that packets from other
ASes can be filtered.
However, these methods do not perform well during
legitimate changes to the Internet’s structure or when
there are multiple paths between two routers [74]. To
counter this problem these methods can consider multi-
ple valid interfaces per source address at the cost of lower
filtering accuracy. Mirkovic et al. [74] proposed dropping
some TCP packets which originate from new interfaces.
Under normal circumstances these packets should be
retransmitted and the operation of the Internet is not
severely compromised. However, this approach does not
help with combating amplification attacks which are
perpetrated using UDP or where the attacker retransmits
attack packets.
4) BGP and Routing Tables: BGP is responsible
exchanging routing information between ASes. As a
result, many papers have proposed that BGP can also
be used to help filter spoofed packets [76], [77], [105],
e.g., by adding anti-spoofing information to BGP update
messages [81] using packet marking techniques such as
Pi which we talk about in Section IV-E2.
One way to use BGP routing tables to filter
spoofed packets is to use Distributed Packet Filtering
(DPF) [76], and its extensions Inter-Domain Packet
Filters (IDPF) [77], [105] and Extended IDPF [134].
Using IDPF a router examines BGP routing tables to
check if it is on the optimal path between the packet’s
source and destination. However, this approach suffers
from the same security flaws as BGP because there is no
built-in mechanism to check the integrity and source of
BGP messages [149]. To improve the security of BGP
and thus IDPF, Dawakhar et al. have suggested using
Credible BGP [150].
E. Tracing the Attacker
Next to detecting and filtering spoofed IP packets,
an orthogonal challenge is to trace the actual source
of spoofed traffic [65]. Such tracing is useful, not only
to stop attacks as they are happening by filtering the
attack traffic at the source (thus saving the resources at
upstream networks), but also so that the perpetrators can
be prosecuted and further attacks prevented.
Tracing spoofed packets is difficult because of limited
access to external routers and the the high overheads
involved. The existing traceback vary in their objective
and where they are applied. For example, an adminis-
trator of a local network might want to know which
MAC address or interface is being used to send spoofed
packets [151], whereas an attack victim might want to
know which network the attack originated from.
In amplification attacks, the victim receives attack
traffic from amplifiers. Thus, the traffic facing the victim
is not spoofed. Instead, spoofing detection and tracebacks
needs to be performed at the amplifiers, possibly with the
help of amplification honeypots [48].
It is also important to realize that the traceback can
only be used to identify the source of spoofed packets.
Detecting the individuals involved requires many out-
band techniques such as monitoring the chat networks
used by cyber criminals. Furthermore, tracing becomes
inherently difficult in case of distributed attack sources,
such as DDoS botnets.
1) Using Traffic Logs: Tracing spoofed packets back
to the attacker can be done by analyzing traffic flow
data collected by routers [113], [121], [144]. With log-
based traceback there is always the potential to trace
a single packet [143], and to trace attackers who use
reflection. However, these methods often require that
traffic data is either collected or stored by routers [107].
This comes with many practical difficulties such as ad-
ditional hardware costs, as was the case with the original
proposal by Snoeren et al. [113], which requires Source
Path Isolation Engine (SPIE) routers in place of existing
routers. One solution to replacing existing routers is to
use tap devices which eavesdrop on traffic [152]. Finally,
one can lower the amount of storage required to trace
attackers by using hashes [121].
2) Packet Marking: The idea of packet marking is
to record the path which packets follow into the pack-
ets [71]. Early packet marking schemes appended the IP
addresses of routers into packets [71], [119]. However,
the four addition bytes needed to represent an IPv4
address and the large number of hops quickly adds to the
size of packets. Song and Perrig suggested reducing the
amount of space required by encoding addresses using
hashing and a map of upstream routers [111]. Yaar et
al. discussed ways to lower the space needed by using
shorter identifiers than IP addresses [82]. However, ap-
pending data unnecessarily to packets is still undesirable
because it can increase fragmentation. To address this
problem some packet marking schemes also suggested
overloading IP header fields [71], [86], [88], [90], [111]
and only encoding the addresses of edge routers [87].
Savage et al. introduced Probabilistic Packet Marking
(PPM) to reduce size and processing overheads of packet
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marking even further [71], [110]3. PPM can be used
to identify network path(s) traversed during an attack
so long as the victim receives sufficient marked pack-
ets. Dong et al. [154] designed a single-bit-per-packet
scheme. However, Adler [92] noted that there is a trade-
off between the number of bits allocated to PPM and the
number of packets that must be received by the victim.
Duwairi et al [155] proposed a hybrid PPM and data
storage method called Distributed Linked-List Traceback
(DLLT). The “store, mark, and forward” operation used
by DLLT requires a “marking field” in each packet
big enough to store a single IP address, and a data
structure on each router in which to store information
about forwarded packets. Any router which marks a
packet must first store the address in the marking field
(if there is one) along with a packet identifier, then the
router is free to write its address in the marking field
before forwarding the packet. A linked list is inherently
created using this operation because the address in the
marking field points to the previous router, which has
a record of where it received the packet from, and so
on. However, its difficult to trace attacks with multiple
attack sources [127]. To counter this, Song and Perrig
looked at the security of markings and proposed using
time-released key chains to authenticate them [111].
Li et al. [12] proposed an efficient packet marking
scheme specifically for reflection attacks called Authen-
ticated Deterministic Packet Marking (ADPM), which is
an extension of the approach proposed by Belenky et
al. [156]. ADPM assumes that all routers are capable of
matching request and response packets and that routers
adjacent to reflectors cooperate to copy packet markings
from the request packets to the replies.
Dean et al. phrase packet marking as a polynomial
reconstruction problem and encodes path information as
points on polynomials [90]. Chen and Lee also extended
their work to target reflection attacks [157]. They did this
by requiring reflectors copy packet markings from the
request packets to the replies. This enables the victim to
trace paths to the attacker using less than 4,100 packets,
but it may be possible to combine logging at routers
and PPM to achieve traceback with a smaller number of
marked packets [120]
A drawback of most packet marking schemes is that
they rely on routers to maintain and update the markers.
In case routers drop or do not extend the marks, packet
marking becomes significantly less effective.
3Shokri et al. [153] had a similar idea 6 years later and called it
Dynamic Marking.
3) ICMP Traceback: Bellovin et al. proposed iTrace
where routers send ICMP messages to the destination
address of packets they forward so that the destination
can see the path which the packet followed [109]. ICMP
traceback can also be probabilistic in that the chance
of a router generating an ICMP message is small, thus
lowering overheads in a similar way to PPM [129], [158],
[159]. Mankin et al. improved iTrace with “intention-
driven” traceback after they noticed that the chance of
a router picking an attack packet close to the attacker
is much smaller than closer to the victim for certain
DoS attacks [129]. Wang and Schulzrinne also proposed
a new ICMP message which can be used in ICMP
traceback for reflection attacks [160].
4) Link Testing: Link testing is the systematic testing
of intermediary links between routers, such as imple-
mented via input debugging [107], DECIDUOUS [70],
or controlled flooding [108], as described next.
Input debugging attempts to determine from which
upstream router an attack is coming from by recursively
generating attack signatures to distinguish malicious
packets from normal traffic. However, attack signatures
that only match malicious traffic are difficult to create.
Good attack signatures match only attack traffic and a
only little to no legitimate traffic [107].
The Intruder Detection and Isolation Protocol
(IDIP) [72] describes an architecture which also uses
attack signatures and can be used for link testing and
attack mitigation. In IDIP a single Discovery Coordinator
sends trace messages to other IDIP enabled devices. The
trace messages contain a description of the event, i.e.,
an attack signature, using the Common Intrusion Spec-
ification Language (CISL) [161]. IDIP devices which
receive trace messages reply with report packets. The
Discovery Coordinator can then decide what action to
take, including instructing other IDIP devices to block
attack traffic for a short amount of time [72].
Another link testing method uses IPSec [162]–[164]
to trace the network from where a spoofed packet
originated. For example, the DECIDUOUS implemen-
tation [70] creates secure tunnels between itself and up-
stream routers until it finds the network from where the
attack is coming from. However, DECIDUOUS needs
to have a complete overview of the network topology
to choose routers with which to tunnel. Furthermore,
DECIDUOUS has high processing and traffic overheads
caused by setting up and tearing down secure tunnels.
Controlled Flooding is a link testing method which
floods each upstream router with packets. This technique
needs the knowledge of the topology of the Internet.
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Thus, a map of the Internet is obtained before link test-
ing [108]. The purpose of flooding upstreaming routers
is to determine if the attack traffic affected. If the attack
traffic is disturbed significantly when sending traffic to
a router then it is assumed that this particular router is
one forwarding attack traffic.
F. Discussion
We have surveyed approaches to defend against spoof-
ing. However, there are also more theoretical works in
this area. For example, given a graph of the network
topology and a set of firewall rules for each node, San-
tiraveewan and Permpoontanalarp proposed a methodol-
ogy which can check to see if spoofing is possible [165].
With all of these defenses, it may be confusing as
to why spoofing is still a problem. There are many
practical and economic reasons. Many of the proposals
incur extra latency, traffic volume, computation, and/or
storage overheads. Others are expensive to implement,
as they require new hardware or staff to maintain them.
Finally, it is not clear how well the methods will perform
with only limited deployment [76], and what rewards
they offer to early adopters [81].
We have seen that it is to difficult to prevent spoofing
or trace the attackers in reflection/amplification attacks
without considerable investment and cooperation by the
different network operators. Therefore, we have to look
for other ways of detecting and mitigating amplification
attacks as soon as possible. The next section will address
this topic in more detail.
V. DETECTING AND MITIGATING AMPLIFICATION
ATTACKS
The preventative measures described in Sections III
and IV are effective defences against amplification at-
tacks. Nevertheless, we have seen that they cannot al-
ways be relied upon. So the defences described in this
section are to be used when preventative measures fail.
Defending against amplification attacks involves at-
tack detection and attack mitigation, e.g. packet filtering
or black holing. Attack detection is easier to perform
near to the victim because traffic flows resemble a funnel
with many attackers sending packets to a single loca-
tion [11]. In contrast, attack mitigation is best performed
closer to the source to save the resources of the victim
and upstream networks.
Chang [42] explained that DoS defenses can be
located at four areas: (i) the victim’s network, (ii)
the victim’s ISP network, (iii) further upstream net-
works, and (iv) attack source networks. Zargar et
al. [11] classifies DoS defenses into two categories: (i)
network/transport-level, and (ii) application-level. They
also sub-categorized DoS defenses based on their de-
ployment location: (i) source, (ii) destination, (iii) net-
work, and (iv) distributed/hybrid.
However, in this survey we are concerned specifically
with amplification attacks, and we observed that it is also
possible to defend against amplification attacks at the
amplifiers. Therefore, we have have split amplification
attack defenses into the following location categories
described in Figure 10: (i) at the victim’s network, (ii) at
the source network(s), (iii) a single unspecified location
in cases where the authors have not been clear about
the deployment location, (iv) distributed, and (v) at the
amplifier(s). In cases where the amplifier itself is the
target of an amplification attack, defenses will be limited
to source-based and amplifier-based defenses.
Distributed Defences
Source Defences Victim Defences
Amplifier Defences
Source AS Victim AS
Amplifier AS
M
x
x
x
x
A
x
x
x
x
V
x
Fig. 10. Locations for defending against amplification attacks.
Routers are marked x.
It is also important to note that not all of the DoS de-
fenses surveyed by Chang and Zargar et al. are applicable
to amplification attacks. The most devastating attacks we
described in Section II originated from multiple sources,
and combined both traffic amplification and reflection.
Therefore, in this section, we will discuss the defenses
in Table III which include new proposals that specifically
target amplification attacks, but we will also include
some older proposals which can part-defend against
amplification attacks, e.g., defenses against reflection.
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TABLE III
METHODS FOR DETECTING AND PREDICTING AMPLIFICATION ATTACKS. SOME OF THESE PROPOSALS ALSO INCLUDE NOVEL
TECHNIQUES WHICH AIM TO IDENTIFY AND FILTER ATTACK PACKETS.
Method and References Description Location Time
Before During
Attack pattern correlation [166] Tries to detect reflection attacks by correlating the arrival
rate of packets at the victim with known attacks.
Victim X
Missing request packets [15], [167]–
[170]
Attempt to match incoming responses to previously sent
requests.
Victim X
History-based IP Filtering (HIP) [171] Attempts to filter packets during periods of high congestion
which come from previously unseen addresses.
Victim X
Comparing incoming and outgoing pack-
ets at source networks (D-WARD) [172],
[173]
Uses protocol specific knowledge to predict the number
of expected responses, e.g., replies to ICMP requests. Can
also rate limit attacks at the source.
Source X
Comparing the volume of incoming and
outgoing traffic [174], [175]
MULTOPS [174] and TOPS [175] Unspecified X
Detection with Information Sharing
(DIS) [176]
Aimed at TCP based reflection attacks, but reflectors
collaborate to improve the accuracy of attack detection.
Similar collaboration could potentially improve attack de-
tection at amplifiers.
Reflectors /
Amplifiers
X
PacketScore [177] Routers score packets, and communicate with a central
server for a global view and filter packets with a high
score.
Distributed X
Repetitive packet sizes [178] Monitoring DNS packet sizes as well as the number of
packets across multiple routers. Suspicion is based on
thresholds calculated using real data from the GEANT
network.
Distributed X
Comparing payload bytes of request and
response packets [13]
Analysed NetFlow data to detect pair-flows where the
response payloads are larger than the request payloads
(a similar idea to that which is used in MULTOPS and
TOPS). Limited to 14 UDP protocols.
Distributed X
Comparing payload bytes of request and
response packets, plus compare packet
sizes of requests [20]
Combines techniques from Rossow [13] (comparing re-
quest and response sizes) and Huistra [178] (similar packet
sizes between requests).
Distributed X
Aggregate-based Congestion Control
(ACC) [179]
Looks for high bandwidth aggregates (collections of pack-
ets sharing the same destination address). Uses pushback
(also used in [180]) to instruct upstream routers to rate-
limit flows.
Distributed X
Spoofing protection for amplifiers [135] Specific to amplification attacks. This method detects
spoofed packets which do not have the correct session key
provided by the amplifier for the source address.
Distributed X
AD and PAD [181], and TRACK [182] A congested victim instructs upstream routers to use packet
marking in order to trace the attack and then requests they
filter the traffic. These methods may need to be updated
for amplification attacks to take reflection into account.
Distributed X
Game theory to predict attacks [183] It is possible to study the motivation of attackers and the
security of the Internet to predict attacks.
n/a X
Darknets to detect scans [13], [184]–
[186]
Monitoring darknet traffic can detect random scans for
amplifiers such as those seen before the Spamhaus at-
tack [186].
Distributed X
Honeypots to detect scans and at-
tacks [13]
Honeypots can take the place of amplifiers and are a
powerful way of detecting scans and amplification attacks.
They also require careful configuration so they do not
cause harm to the victim.
Amplifiers X X
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A. Victim-end Defenses
Despite attack detection and packet filtering being
separate objectives, many proposals attempt to do both
near the victim.
Kambourakis et al. [15], [167] proposed a DNS Am-
plification Attacks Detector (DAAD) which logs outgo-
ing DNS requests and incoming responses in lookup
tables at the victim’s network. Responses are matched
to outgoing requests and responses that don’t match
requests are flagged as suspicious. The authors also
propose that the DAAD should be able to alter firewall
rules to filter packets. However, amplification attacks do
not only misuse DNS as we described in Section II. So
a more general detection method is desirable.
Tsunoda et al. [169] proposed a general method for
matching request and response packets at a single point
between the amplifier and the victim, e.g., at the vic-
tim’s gateway router. They later extended their work
with mathematical analysis and additional experimental
results [170]. However, in order to correctly identify
the responses for each request, a router needs to record
the source and destination addresses, protocol field,
application headers, etc. for every request it forwards.
This requires memory-intense management operations.
A partial solution to this problem is to use Bloom
filters to efficiently store requests and check them against
incoming response packets [168].
History-based IP Filtering (HIP) [171] attempts to
filter packets during periods of high congestion which
come from previously unseen addresses. It does this by
adding addresses to a table during normal operation, and
uses a sliding window to remove expired addresses.
Wei et al. [166] proposed using traffic pattern corre-
lation to look for patterns which are out of the ordinary,
or which match known attack patterns. The advantages
of using traffic pattern correlation and HIP for attack
detection, are that they are lightweight and protocol
independent. However, methods to detect attacks based
on previous behavior can struggle to distinguish between
attacks and unexpected bursts in legitimate traffic (flash
crowds) [187]. Furthermore, an attacker that knows these
defenses can “train” the victim before the attack [171].
After an attack has been identified, traffic can be
dropped before it enters the victim network by in-
strumenting the control plane. A common approach is
blackholing of IP prefixes or host addresses at Internet
Exchange Points (IXP) [188]. In this case, a border router
of the victim network signals a specific next hop for the
addresses under attack, using BGP updates. Traffic from
neighboring routers to the victim will then be forwarded
to this IP addresses (or more precisely to the MAC
address), and finally discarded at IXP layer-2 ingress
switches.
Detecting attacks at the victim’s network may be
ineffective because bandwidth may have already become
saturated, or the volume of traffic is too much to process.
This means that automated responses for filtering packets
or alerting upstream routers to throttle traffic may not
function correctly. In order to avoid this problem, another
possible location for detecting and filtering amplification
attacks is at the source network.
B. Source-end Defenses
Source-end defenses are desirable because they can
stop attack traffic before it gets to upstream routers.
However, source-end detection and filtering techniques
may not be an effective defense against amplification
attacks because: (i) the source of the attack can be dis-
tributed, meaning that the solutions need to be deployed
on all networks, (ii) it can be difficult to differentiate
between legitimate and attack traffic if each attacker only
sends a few requests, and (iii) there is no immediate
incentive for network providers to deploy source-end
detection and filtering techniques because it is unclear
what benefit it offers their customers.
One example of a scheme proposed to work at the
attack source is by Mirkovic et al. [172], [173]. They
proposed D-WARD specifically to detect DoS attacks
which involve spoofed packets or high traffic volumes.
They monitor both inbound and outbound traffic flows at
the source network, and compare them with flow models
derived from normal traffic. The authors also note that an
attacker will not reduce its outbound traffic even when
notified of congestion at the victim, so D-WARD can rate
limit suspected source addresses at upstream routers.
C. Distributed Defenses
Victim-end and source-end defenses tend to be de-
signed to run in isolation on a single machine, e.g., at
a border router between networks. However, detecting
and filtering amplification attacks at a single point in the
Internet is problematic because of asymmetric routing,
and the fact that attacks are distributed. This means
that in order for isolated defenses to be effective, all
inbound and outbound paths in the Internet should be
symmetrical, and all networks should support the new
defenses.
Amplification attacks are distributed threats against
many potential victims, and as a result they require
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distributed defenses. Some distributed defenses also
can detect and filter attacks after a victim has been
taken offline by the attack and cannot use automated
methods which use the affected connections to alert
upstream routers [13], [20], [177], [178]. It is even
possible to detect and filter DoS attacks with limited
deployment of a distributed protocol alongside legacy
equipment/protocols [189].
Kim et al. [177] proposed PacketScore which uses
a DDoS Control Server (DCS) to collate reports from
routers across the Internet. Routers with special reporting
capabilities, called Detecting-Differentiating-Discarding
Routers (3D-R), mark suspicious packets with a “score”
which reflects how likely they are to be involved in an
attack. The 3D-Rs then filter packets based on a variable
score threshold provided by the DCS, which varies the
threshold depending on the current load at the victim and
the score distribution of attacking packets.
Mahajan et al. proposed attack detection at victims in
terms of “aggregate” flows, and proposed using push-
back mechanisms to filter flows at upstream networks
whenever a link experiences sustained severe conges-
tion [179]. In pushback, the congested router asks up-
stream routers which are involved in the flow aggregate
to rate limit traffic flows [179], [180].
Chen and Park [181] proposed an Attack Diagnostic
(AD) system in which DoS attacks are detected near to
the victim, and packet filtering is executed close to the
attacker. AD also combines some familiar techniques;
packet marking (Section IV-E2) is used for traceback,
and an approach similar to pushback is used to alert the
source networks. Similarly, TRACK combines packing
marking with packet filtering [182]. However, AD and
Track are currently not suitable defenses for amplifica-
tion attacks because their traceback methods will only
trace back to the amplifier, but not to the actual attacker.
It is also possible to detect amplification attacks by
analyzing traffic flow data collected by multiple routers.
Usually these methods require data from locations be-
tween the source and the amplifier, as well as data from
between the amplifier and the victim [13], [20], [178].
However, it is not required to have data from between
the attacker and amplifier simply to detect DDoS attacks.
Yu et al. [187] proposed using flow correlation to detect
DDoS attacks, but unlike the correlating method pro-
posed by Wei et al. [166], Yu’s method can distinguish
attacks from flash crowds. This was possible because
it has access to data collected by multiple routers in a
“community network”.
Huistra showed that amplification attacks can be
detected specifically by monitoring DNS packet sizes
as well as the number of packets across multiple
routers [178]. Huistra’s method is split into two parts.
The first (which can also be used to detect attackers)
focuses on detecting IP addresses generating a suspicious
number of similar sized DNS requests. Suspicion is
based on thresholds calculated using real data from the
GEANT network [178]. The second part can be used to
detect the victim, and looks at the number of large DNS
packets sent to a single IP address.
Rossow’s analysis and detection of amplification at-
tacks is similar to Huistra’s but is not limited to a single
protocol [13]. Instead, he focused on 14 UDP protocols
which allow amplification. By analyzing traffic samples
taken from routers belonging to a single ISP, Rossow was
able to detect 15 real life amplification attacks against
multiple victims by comparing sent and received bytes.
Based on the work by Rossow, Bo¨ttger et al. [20]
developed a protocol-agnostic approach to detect ampli-
fication attacks. They introduce the following detection
criteria, which are independent of a specific network
service, but base on the assumption that attackers reuse
attack requests: (i) similar packet size among all requests
(and responses), (ii) similar payload among all requests
(and responses), (iii) an increased amount of ICMP
unreachable messages, and (iv) incorrect TTL values.
They found that the first two criteria are most suitable
for amplification detection.
D. Defenses At Reflectors/Amplifiers
Rossow and Huistra also showed that it is possible
to detect open DNS resolvers that have been abused in
amplification attacks by analyzing traffic data collected
by routers in a similar way as mentioned in the previ-
ous subsection, but from an amplifiers perspective [13],
[178].
Another approach for filtering spoofed packets, which
was specifically designed to defend against amplification
attacks, requires that session tokens are sent along with
requests to amplifiers [135]. This requires that the first
time a request is received from a new address, the
amplifier replies with a unique session token which the
sender should include in all future requests.
Including the same session token in all requests has
low processing overheads but adds to the size of each
packet. Furthermore, it is prone to eavesdropping if
session tokens are not encrypted. If the attacker can
eavesdrop on the victims Internet traffic then they can
also agree new session tokens with amplifiers the victim
has not yet contacted.
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Peng et al. [176] focused on TCP based reflection
attacks and used mechanics which might also improve
the accuracy of detection at amplifiers. Their method
monitored the cause of packets instead of just counting
them. In their proposal, reflectors monitor incoming TCP
RST packets and monitor those which have a corre-
sponding SYN/ACK state for the outgoing connection.
RST packets indicate that the reflector received a spoofed
SYN packet from an attacker and sent a SYN/ACK to
the victim, at which point the victim has replied with
a RST packet. Peng et al. suggested that collaboration
between reflectors can be used to improve the accuracy
of attack detection. Once an attack has been detected,
their system sends a warning to all other participating
reflectors instructing them to stop the attack.
E. Defenses at Single Unspecified Locations
Not all DoS attack defenses are designed with a partic-
ular location in mind, or the location was not explicitly
specified. This is problematic because the challenges
vary among locations.
MUlti-Level Tree for On-line Packet Statistics (MUL-
TOPS) [174] is one example where a router somewhere
on the Internet is used to compare the volume of in-
coming and outgoing traffic to look for DoS attacks.
However, if MULTOPS is used on central routers which
route packets for many different addresses, then the tree
data structure it relies on will consume a significant
amount of resources. In fact, MULTOPS itself can be
targeted by memory exhaustion attack [174], [175].
Tabulated On-line Packet Statistics (TOPS) [175] im-
proves on the accuracy of MULTOPS by taking into
account the protocol being used, and also improves
efficiency by using fixed length tables instead of trees.
This makes TOPS suitable for use on busy links [11].
Both MULTOPS and TOPS assume that legitimate in-
coming and outgoing traffic is proportional [175]. How-
ever, this is not always the case, e.g., when streaming
video. Attackers may also try to counteract MULTOPS
and TOPS by trying to balance incoming and outgoing
data volumes during an attack [11].
F. Predicting Future Attacks
It is desirable to know about DoS attacks before they
happen. To this end, Fultz et al. [183] proposed using a
game theoretical approach to predict DDoS attacks. They
found that attackers only launch attacks if defenders have
not invested in adequate protection or if penalties, e.g,
monetary costs and risks of being caught are low.
It is also possible to detect scans for amplifiers which
may act as a warning for future attacks. For example,
darknets (also known as blackholes) are unused IP ad-
dress spaces on the Internet. Since the IP addresses in
darknets are supposed to be unused, any traffic to or from
a darknet is a sign of either scanning, misconfiguration,
or malicious intent [190].
Fachkha et al. [184]–[186] looked at 1.44TB of traffic
data for a /13 address block of darknet IPs 4, and found
134 separate incidents which they claimed may have
been amplification attacks.
However, Fachkha et al. may have detected scans for
open DNS resolvers rather than actual attacks. To explore
this idea we can look at Tables 7 and 8 in [186] to see
the incidents they detected. Specifically, they detected
2 large events (February 19th and March 18th) with
very high packets per minute. March 18th is interesting
because it is the same day as the Spamhaus attack [8].
However, this looks like a horizontal IP scan because it
targets 50,257 separate IPs with 1 packet each, which is
indicative of a horizontal scan rather than an attack.
We can also take a closer look at the Spamhaus
incident by using Figure 6 of [186], which shows the
packets per hour going to the Darknet monitored by
Farsight Security:
• The first spike we are interested in is at 337 hours,
which is on the 14th of March. This is shortly
before the Spamhaus attack which was reported by
CloudFlare as taking place on March 18th [8].
• The second interesting data spike at 385-409 hours
is also before the attack.
• The graph for the 18th of March (the day of the
attack) is one of the quietest periods shown.
• The next spike they detect is at 517 hours, which
is 3 days after the attack.
By referencing what we know about the Spamhaus
attack [8], we suggest that the information presented by
Fachkha et al. [186] shows horizontal scans for open
DNS resolvers which may be related to the Spamhaus
attack. Furthermore, attackers are unlikely to waste band-
width sending speculative requests to unknown IPs when
they can try to maximise the impact of an attack by only
sending requests to known amplifiers. This supported by
the quiet period observed by Fachkha et al. on March
18th.
Finally, to support defenses and monitor attacks, one
can set up amplification honeypots that emulate protocols
4The data was provided to Fachkha et al. by Farsight Security
https://www.farsightsecurity.com/.
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that are vulnerable to amplification abuse. Honeypots
can be used to log scanning activity and report attacks
that abuse them. In addition, Kra¨mer et al. show that
honeypots can be used to derive signatures of attack
traffic, such as domains abused in DNS requests [48],
which is useful for detecting future attacks.
G. Discussion
Most of the defenses described in this section focus on
amplification attack detection and filtering at the victim
or by using distributed algorithms. Amplification attack
defenses at the source networks are more desirable, but
it is unlikely that defences specific to a single attack,
e.g., amplification attacks, will be implemented in the
short-term and on a large scale.
One contribution of this paper is to survey the defenses
currently available for amplifiers and to make some
suggestions for future directions. We found that this area
has had relatively little attention compared to defenses at
routers, but by adopting one of the approaches detailed
in Section III it may be possible for amplifiers to prevent
amplification attacks from happening in the first place.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper discusses the current state of the art of
research proposals for detecting, preventing, and tracing
amplification attacks. As part of this, we have also
surveyed defenses against source IP address spoofing,
which is essential for amplification attacks.
We have concluded that preventing source IP spoofing
is the effective way of defending against amplification
attacks. However, spoofed packets can still be sent from
large parts of the Internet. So we need effective methods
to detect and filter DoS attack packets as close to the
source as possible.
Another subject for future work is to assess the de-
fenses we have covered against one another using a wider
list of empirical criteria, e.g., monetary cost, accuracy,
memory overheads, levels of inter-AS cooperation, etc.
Zargar et al. [11] surveyed the metrics used to asses DoS
defenses and discussed their categorization in some of
these terms. However, a more detailed study on individ-
ual defenses is crucial because all of the proposals we
surveyed come with their own strengths and weaknesses.
Some of which may not be obvious, and it is important
for system administrators to be able to weigh up their
options in a concise and meaningful way.
Promising amplification attack defences appear to be
distributed DoS detection and filtering algorithms, which
TABLE IV
INITIATIVES TO IDENTIFY AMPLIFIERS
Reference Description
Open Resolver
Scanning
Project [191]
Scans for open DNS resolvers and provide an
automated system to notify affected networks.
Open DNS
Resolver
Project [26]
Scans for open resolvers and allows to query
for such resolvers in a certain IP address range.
Measurement
Factory [192]
Maintains a list of DNS servers that are known
to serve as globally accessible open resolvers.
Open NTP
Project [193]
Scans for NTP servers in IPv4 which can be
used in an amplification attack.
can mitigate attacks even when the victim has gone off-
line and is unable to take counter-measures itself. How-
ever, these methods require more collaboration between
network providers than is currently the case [11].
More research is required to close the attack vectors
which are being used in amplification attacks, e.g, clos-
ing open DNS resolvers, patching NTP servers, and pro-
moting ingress filtering. A number of ongoing initiatives
aim at tackling these issues, as summarized in Table IV.
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